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Abstract
We analyze optimal consumption in the life cycle model by intro-
ducing life and pension insurance contracts. The model contains a
credit market with biometric risk, and market risk via risky securi-
ties. This idealized framework enables us to clarify important aspects
life insurance and pension contracts. We find optimal pension plans
and life insurance contracts where the benefits are state dependent.
We compare these solutions both to the ones of standard actuarial
theory, and to policies offered in practice. Implications of this include
what role the insurance industry may play to improve welfare. The
relationship between substitution of consumption and risk aversion is
highlighted in the presence of a consumption puzzle. One problem
related portfolio choice is discussed - the horizon problem. Finally, we
present some comments on longevity risk and cohort risk.
KEYWORDS: The life cycle model, pension insurance, optimal life in-
surance, longevity risk, the horizon problem, consumption puzzle.
JEL: D 91
1 Introduction
Four or five decennials back life and pension insurance seemed less problem-
atic than today, at least from the insurance companies’ point of view. Prices
were set by actuaries using life tables, and a ”fixed calculation” interest rate.
This rate was not directly linked to the equilibrium interest rate of the mar-
ket, or any other market linked quantities or indexes. The premium reserves
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of the individual and collective policies were invested in various assets, and
when the different contracts were settled, the evolution of the premium re-
serve determined the final insurance compensation. If the return on the
premium reserve had been higher than the calculation rate, this gave rise to
a bonus. For a mutual company ”bonus” need not only involve a payment
from the insurer to the customer, but could also involve a payment in the
other direction. For a stock owned corporation the bonus could in principle
only be non-negative. In most cases this did not matter all that much, since
the calculation rate was set to the safe side, which meant lower than the
realized return rate on the premium reserve.
In several countries the nominal interest rate was high during some parts
of this period, often significantly higher than the fixed rate used in determin-
ing premiums. In Norway, for example, this calculation rate (4%) appeared
from some point in time as a legal guaranteed return rate in the contracts.
For current policies this guarantee is reduced to 3%, and even lower.
During the last two or three decennials this interest rate guarantee has
become a major issue for many life insurance companies. What initially ap-
peared to be a benefit with almost no value, later turned out to be rather
valuable for the policy holders, and correspondingly problematic for the in-
surers.
In this paper we study demand theory under idealized conditions using
the life cycle model. This model takes the security market as given. Al-
though the model does not explicitly contain insurance companies, nor a
public sector, optimal insurance contracts are assumed to exist. We derive
optimal contracts in this complete model, and compare these to contracts
that are offered in the real world. We argue that the insurance industry can
provide more consumption substitution over the life time of the consumers,
than they can manage alone - since companies do not have any finite horizon.
The preference structure implies that some smoothing in consumption is de-
sired by the individuals. However, the analysis reveals a consumption puzzle
when confronted with aggregate consumption and market data. Among other
things this says that the representative individual do not prefer quite as much
smoothing as implied by the real data. Thus something seems to be wrong
with the model employed for the individual - it does not quite match reality.
Recursive utility, the subject of a companion paper, give better results on
these particular issues.
Every downturn in the financial market has typically been accompanied
by problems for the life insurance industry. This is particularly true for pri-
vately owned life insurance companies, with a regulatory regime that focuses
on yearly results. Collective pension funds with a different form of regula-
tion seem less affected. For both types of companies the contracts offered
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are typically long term.
In view of this, managements of privately owned life insurance companies
seem to prefer to offer ”defined contribution” type policies to the more tra-
ditional ”defined benefit” ones. The former type exposes the companies less
to risk than the latter, and equity can be set lower. A thought provoking
observation is then that when customers are asked what type of contract they
prefer, the answer is typically defined benefit, i.e., the contract with most
consumption smoothing. This is consistent with the view that customers can,
by and large, manage ordinary savings themselves, including saving through
the financial markets, for example by investing in mutual funds. What they
need from an insurer is precisely - insurance. This means a reliable arrange-
ment providing yearly payment of known real value to cover subsistence, and
a little more, in the case that the individual’s savings strategy did not work
out all that well.
One would think that life and pension insurance companies should be able
to offer precisely this kind of insured pensions to the public. This industry
is normally perceived as taking a long term perspective, and should be able
to let the equity premium work to their advantage in the long run. While an
individual customer may have problems to carry out an optimal substitution
of consumption during his/her life time because of a bounded life span, the
insurance industry is presumably less constrained in this regard, and should
be able to ”time diversity”.
If the insurance industry only offers defined contribution, or unit linked-
type pension plans, finance theory tells us that the industry can only expect
to earn the risk-free rate in the long run. The insurers will then compete
with investment funds and other financial intermediaries, and the fees should
eventually come down due to competition. The resulting return on the in-
surance companies’ operations is unlikely to meet the requirements of the
owners. On the other hand, there is the principle of dynamic consistency,
which tells us that when there is some product demanded by enough people,
there will eventually be a market for this product. So where does that lead
the insurance industry? These are some of the topics discussed in this paper.
When there is consumption in several periods in a world with a perfect
credit market with no financial risk, the standard model turns out to works
just fine. This is also the case in a one period problem with financial uncer-
tainty, a so-called timeless situation. When there is consumption in several
periods (at least two) and there is also financial risk, we have a so-called
temporal problem. In such situations induced preferences may not satisfy
the substitution axiom, so the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility
(Eu) theory does not have axiomatic underpinnings. This problem is taken
up in the companion paper.
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The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce consumption
and saving with only a credit market available. Here we explain some actu-
arial concepts related to mortality. In particular we study the effects from
pooling.
In Section 3 we include mortality risk, i.e., an uncertain planning horizon,
in the model of Section 2 and derive both optimal life insurance as well as
optimal pension insurance, and investigate their properties when there is only
a credit market present.
In Section 4 we introduce a financial market for risky securities in addition
to the pure risk free credit market. Here we derive the optimal consumption
and pension insurance, and show that with pension insurance available, the
actual consumption rate at each time is larger than without.
In Section 5 we discuss a consumption puzzle, when the theory is con-
fronted with real data. In Section 6 we discuss business cycles. In Section
7 we derive implications of the optimal pension plan, and discuss compara-
tive statics. In Section 8 the connection to actuarial theory and insurance
practice is briefly taken up, and in Section 9 a one-period ”timeless” model
is presented in order to analyze to what extent a pension insurance works
as diversification. In Section 10 we finally analyze life insurance. Here we
determine the optimal amount of life insurance, a state dependent quantity
- a result we claim is new, and discuss its possible relevance to the insurance
industry. The portfolio choice problem is briefly studied in Section 11, in
Section 12 we point out a solution to time horizon problem and in Section 13
we study a second portfolio choice puzzle. Finally, in Section 14 we reflect on
longevity risk and cohort risk, and give in Section 15 a summary discussion
of our results, where we also suggest some extensions.
2 Consumption and Saving
In our development it will be an advantage to start with the simplest problem
in optimal demand theory, when there is no risk and no uncertainty of any
kind.
Consider a person having income e(t) and consumption c(t) at time t.
Given income, possible consumption plans must depend on the possibilities
for saving and for borrowing and lending. We want to investigate the possi-
bilities of using income during one period to generate consumption in another
period.
To start, assume the consumer can borrow and lend to the same interest
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rate r. Given any e and c, the consumer’s net saving W (t) at time t is
W (t) =
∫ t
0
er(t−s)(es − cs)ds. (1)
Assuming the person wants to consume as much as possible for any e, not
any consumption plan is feasible. A constraint of the type W (t) ≥ a(t) may
seem reasonable: If a(t) < 0 for some t, the consumer is allowed a net debt at
time t. Another constraint could be W (T ) ≥ B ≥ 0, where T is the planner’s
horizon. The consumer is then required to be solvent at time T .
The objective is to optimize the utility U(c) of lifetime consumption sub-
ject to a budget constraint. There could also be a bequest motive when life
insurance is an issue.
2.1 Uncertain planning horizon
In order to formulate the most natural budget constraint of an individual,
which takes into account the advantages of pooling risk, we introduce mor-
tality. Yaari (1965), Hakansson (1969) and Fisher (1973) were of the first to
include an uncertain lifetime into the theory of the consumer.
The remaining lifetime Tx of an x year old consumer at time zero is a
random variable with support (0, τ) and cumulative probability distribution
function F x(t) = P (Tx ≤ t), t ≥ 0. The survival function is denoted by
F¯ x(t) = P (Tx > t). Ignoring possible selection effects, it can be shown that
F¯ x(t) =
l(x+ t)
l(x)
(2)
for some function l(·) of one variable only. The decrement function l(x) can
be interpreted as the expected number alive in age x from a population of
l(0) newborne.
The force of mortality, or death intensity, is defined as
µx(t) =
fx(t)
1− F x(t) = −
d
dt
ln F¯ x(t), F x(t) < 1, (3)
where fx(t) is the probability density function of Tx. Integrating this expres-
sion yields the survival function in terms of the force of mortality
F¯ x(t) =
l(x+ t)
l(x)
= exp
{
−
∫ t
0
µx(u) du
}
. (4)
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Suppose y ≥ 0 a.s. is a non-negative process in L, the set of consumption
processes. Later L will be a set of adapted stochastic processes y satisfying
E(
∫ τ
0
y2t dt) <∞. If Tx and y are independent, the formula
E
(∫ Tx
0
ytdt
)
=
∫ τ
0
E(yt)
l(x+ t)
l(x)
dt =
∫ τ
0
E(yt)e
− ∫ t0 µx(u)dudt (5)
follows essentially from integration by parts, the independence assumption
and Fubini’s Theorem. Assuming the interest rate r is a constant, it follows
that the single premium of an annuity paying one unit per unit of time is
given by the actuarial formula
a¯(r)x =
∫ τ
0
e−rt
lx+t
lx
dt, (6)
and the single premium of a ”temporary annuity” which terminates after
time n is
a¯
(r)
x:n¯| =
∫ n
0
e−rt
lx+t
lx
dt. (7)
Under a typical pension plan the insured will pay a constant, or ”level”
premium p up to some time of retirement n, and from then on he will receive
an annuity b as long as he lives. The principle of equivalence gives the
following relationship between premium and benefit:
p
∫ n
0
e−rt
lx+t
lx
dt = b
∫ τ
n
e−rt
lx+t
lx
dt.
In standard actuarial notation this is written
pa¯
(r)
x:n¯| = b(a¯
(r)
x − a¯(r)x:n¯|). (8)
The following formulas are sometimes useful in life insurance computations
µx(t) = − l
′(x+ t)
l(x+ t)
, and fx(t) = − l
′(x+ t)
l(x)
=
l(x+ t)
l(x)
µx+t, (9)
where l′(x+t) is the derivative of l(x+t) with respect to t. The present value
of one unit payable at time of death is denoted A¯x. Using (9) and integration
by parts, it can be written
A¯x =
∫ τ
0
e−rtfx(t)dt = 1− ra¯(r)x . (10)
This insurance contract is called Whole life insurance. If the premium rate p
is paid until the retirement age n for a combined life insurance with z units
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payable upon death, and an annuity of rate b per time unit as long as the
insured is alive, we have the following relationship between p, b and z:
pa¯
(r)
x:n¯| = b(a¯
(r)
x − a¯(r)x:n¯|) + z(1− ra¯(r)x ). (11)
Pension insurance and life insurance can now be integrated in the life cycle
model in a natural way, as we shall demonstrate.
2.2 The effect from pooling
In the discussion of consumption and saving, the following quantity plays an
important role:
E
{
W (Tx)e
−rTx} = expected discounted net savings. (12)
In the absence of a life and pension insurance market, one would, as before,
consider consumption plans c such that W (Tx) ≥ B, or
W (Tx)e
−rTx ≥ b ≥ 0 almost surely (13)
e.g., debt must be resolved before the time of death. If, on the other hand,
pension insurance is possible, one can allow consumption plans where
E
{
W (Tx)e
−rTx} = 0 (no life insurance.) (14)
Those individuals who live longer than average are guaranteed a pension
as long as they live via the pension insurance market. The financing of this
benefit comes from those who live shorter that average, which is what pooling
is all about.
The implication is that the individual’s savings possibilities are ”ex-
hausted”, by allowing gambling on own life length. Clearly the above con-
straint in (14) is less demanding than requiring that the discounted net sav-
ings, the random variable in (13), is larger that some non-negative number
b with certainty. Integration by parts gives the following expression for the
expected discounted net savings
E
{
W (Tx)e
−rTx} = ∫ τ
0
(
e(t)− c(t))e− ∫ t0 (r+µx+u)dudt. (15)
This expression we have interpreted as the present value of the consumer’s
net savings, which is seen from (15) to take place at a ”spot” interest rate
r + µ > r
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where the inequality follows since the mortality rate µ > 0. This is a result
of the the pooling effect of (life and) pension insurance. The existence of a
life and pension insurance market allows the individuals to save at a higher
interest rate than the spot rate r. With a pure pension insurance contract, the
policyholder can consume more while alive, since terminal debt is resolved by
pooling. This is illustrated later in an example when also market uncertainty
is taken into account.
Example 1. (A Pension Contract, or an Annuity). Suppose e(t) = 0 for
t > n. The condition E
{
W (Tx)e
−rTx} = 0 is seen to correspond to the
Principle of Equivalence in this situation:∫ n
0
(
e(t)− c(t))P [Tx > t]e−rtdt = ∫ τ
n
c(t)e−rtP [Tx > t]dt. (16)
Here the difference (et − ct) can be interpreted as the premium (intesity) pt
paid while working, giving rise to the ”pension” (or total consumption rate)
ct after the time of retirement n. This relationship implies that the pension
is paid out to the beneficiary as long as necessary, and only then, i.e., as long
as the policy holder is alive. 
Notice the similarity between the actuarial formula in (8) and the above
equation (16). Both equations are, of course, based on the same principle. It
presents no difficulty to separate ordinary savings from pension in the above,
but for the sake of simplicity of exposure, we shall employ an integrated
approach in what follows.
3 The optimal demand theory with only a
credit market
3.1 Introduction
In order to analyze the problem of optimal consumption (including optimal
pension), we need assumptions about the preferences of the consumer. To
start, we assume the preferences are represented by a utility function U : L→
R given by the additive and separable von Neumann-Morgenstern expected
utility of the form
U(c) = E
{∫ Tx
0
e−δtu(ct)dt+ e−κTxv(WTx)
}
. (17)
Here δ and κ represent utility discounting, and are interpreted as impatience
rates, u is a strictly increasing and concave utility function, and v is a another
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utility function. The function v is connected to life insurance, and may
represent a bequest motive, but as we will argue later, ”bequest” is not
always the most natural cause for life insurance. The functions u and v are
sometimes referred to as felicity indices. Later, in Section 5, we refine this
representation of preferences to recursive utility.
The classical reference to this material is of course Ramsey (1928). We
could, in a natural way, have extended the analysis to include a recursive
structure of preferences like in Koopmans (1960), which is often taken as
a precursor to recursive utility. As it turns out, the standard model can
manage well when there is no risk, so this would be to complicate things
unnecessary. The possible problem with this model is simply that the world
contains risk, the model does not.
The variable z = W (Tx) is the amount of life insurance. It is often as-
sumed to be a given constant (e.g., 1) in the standard theory of life insurance,
but we will allow it to be a random variable that the decision maker can have
some influence on. First we focus on pensions and annuities and set v ≡ 0.
3.2 The pension problem
The pension problem may then be formulated as:
max
c
E
{∫ Tx
0
e−δtu(ct)dt
}
(18)
subject to (i) E
(
W (Tx)e
−rTx) = 0, and (ii) ct ≥ 0 for all t. Ignoring the
positivity constraint (ii) for the moment, we may use Kuhn-Tucker and a
variational argument to solve this problem. The Lagrangian is
L(c;λ) =
∫ τ
0
u(ct)e
− ∫ t0 (δ+µx+s)dsdt+ λ(∫ τ
0
(
e(t)− c(t))e− ∫ t0 (r+µx+s)dsdt).
If c∗(t) is optimal, there exists a Lagrange multiplier λ such that L(c;λ)
is maximized at c∗(t) and complementary slackness holds. Denoting the
directional derivative of L(c∗;λ) in the direction c by 5L(c∗, λ; c), the first
order condition of this unconstrained problem is
5L(c∗, λ; c) = 0 in all ’directions’ c ∈ L,
which is equivalent to∫ τ
0
(
u′(c∗t )e
− ∫ t0 (δ+µx+s)ds − λe− ∫ t0 (r+µx+sds)c(t)dt = 0, ∀c ∈ L.
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This gives the first order condition
u′(c∗t ) = λe
−(r−δ)t, t ≥ 0. (19)
Notice that the force of mortality µx(t) does not enter this expression.
Differentiating this function in t along the optimal path c∗, we deduce
the following differential equation for c∗
dc∗t
dt
= (r − δ)T (c∗t ), (20)
where T(c) = − u′(c)
u′′(c) . When financial risk is present, this quantity is inter-
preted as the absolute risk tolerance function of the consumer, the reciprocal
of the absolute risk aversion function A(c) i.e., T(c) = 1/A(c). Here this
interpretation does not make much sense, since there is no (financial) risk,
only biometric risk which we assume can be diversified away by pooling.
The interpretation in the present situation is, perhaps, best illustrated by an
example.
Exampel 2. (A Pension Contract for the CEIS Consumer.) Assume that
the income process et is:
et =
{
y, if t ≤ n;
0, if t > n
(21)
where y is a constant, interpreted as the consumer’s salary when working.
The utility function is assumed power utility u(c) = 1
1−ρc
1−ρ. The parameter
ρ ≥ 0 is called the time preference parameter 1. This utility function has
a constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution (CEIS) in consumption,
denoted by ψ and related to the parameter ρ via ψ = 1
ρ
.
Returning to the first order conditions, the optimal consumption (and
pension) is then c∗t = ke
1
ρ
(r−δ)t, where k is an integration constant. Equality
in constraint (i) determines the constant k: The optimal life time consump-
tion (t ∈ [0, n]) and pension (t ∈ [n, τ)) is then
c∗t = y
a¯
(r)
x:n¯|
a¯
(r0)
x
e
1
ρ
(r−δ) t for all t ≥ 0. (22)
Here r0 = r − r−δρ and a¯(r)x:n¯| and a¯(r0)x are the actuarial formulas explained in
(6) and (7). Although the first order conditions in (19) do not depend on
1Some readers may now be confused and rename this parameter γ, and interpret it as
the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA). Again, this interpretation is meaningless
here, since there is no financial risk.
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mortality, the optimal consumption c∗t does, since the Lagrange multiplier λ,
or equivalently, the integration constant k, is determined from the ’average’
budget constraint (i). Also, the positivity constraint (ii) is not binding at
the optimum, due to the form of the felicity index u. Notice that in this
example, T(x) = ψ x for all x. 
For the CEIS-utility of this example, we notice that the function A(x) =
ρ/x is associated with the time preference ρ, and the function T is similarly
associated to the EIS-parameter ψ.
3.3 The effects from changing EIS
The differential equation (20) tells us that the value of the interest rate r is
a crucial border value for the impatience rate δ. When δ > r the optimal
consumption c∗t is always a decreasing function of time t, when δ < r the
optimal consumption increases with time. In the first case, the ’impatient’
one has already consumed so much, that he can only look forward to a
decreasing consumption path. The ’patient’ one can, on the other hand,
look forward to a steadily increasing future consumption path. In Example
2 we see from (22) that the former has an optimal consumption path that is
a decreasing exponentially, while the latter has an exponentially increasing
consumption path. This seems to suggest that it may be difficult to compare
consumption paths between different consumers. That this is not so clear-
cut as this example might suggest, will follow when we introduce a securities
market where the consumers are allowed to invest in risky securities as well
as a risk-less asset in order to maximize lifetime consumption.
In Example 2 we can derive comparative statics for the EIS-parameter
ψ = 1
ρ
. This can be inferred from the following
∂
∂ψ
c∗t = y
a¯
(r)
x:n¯|e
ψ (r−δ) t
(a¯
(r0)
x )2
(r − δ) (t− τ0) , (23)
where the constant time τ0 is found from the first mean value theorem for
integrals: ∫ τ
0
s
lx+s
lx
e−r0s ds = τ0
∫ τ
0
lx+s
lx
e−r0s ds
for some τ0 ∈ (0, τ). For the patient individual, an increase in ψ leads to an
increase in consumption later on (i.e., for t > τ0) and a decrease earlier in life
(t < τ0). For the impatient individual the conclusions are just the opposite.
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3.4 The effects from changes in the interest rate
It is also of interest to explore the effect on optimal consumption of an in-
crease in the interest rate. This will shed some further light on the interpre-
tation of the EIS in the present situation. Loosely speaking, EIS deals with
the individual’s ability to manage deterministic variations in consumption in
order to increase overall utility. In the present case with no financial risk,
it is indeed the EIS interpretation, or equivalently, time preference, that is
relevant. When risk is introduced, the parameter ρ will play more than one
role for the conventional model.
An individual with a low value of ρ requires less compensation in the
future for a decrease in consumption today, than an individual with a larger
value of ρ. If an individual has a low value of ρ, this means that this person is
relatively ”neutral” to consumption substitution across time. The individual
has a high ability to do this type of transfer, and, will need typically need
little help from others, like a life and pension insurance company, or other
financial institution. This person has an associated large value for ψ. When
ρ = 0 the individual is neutral with respect to consumption substitution,
and has an infinite EIS-parameter.
Think of a bear living in the northern hemisphere as having a large value
of the EIS-parameter ψ. This animal may easily postpone consumption for
several months, and is well-suited to tackle the significant deterministic vari-
ations in consumption posed by the differences between the seasons. A lem-
ming, to take another example, could not postpone consumption in this way
since it would then simply die.2 The property of consumption substitution
has nothing to do with risk aversion, which is addressing something else,
namely the individual’s attitude to variations across the states of nature.
Returning to the effect on the optimal consumption of an increase in the
risk free interest rate r, we get
∂
∂r
c∗t = y
a¯
(r)
x:n¯|e
1
ρ
(r−δ) t
(a¯
(r0)
x )2
ψ
(
t−
( 1
ψ
τ
(n)
1 + (1−
1
ψ
)τ2
))
, (24)
where the two time points τ
(n)
1 and τ2 are defined by first mean value theorem
for integrals as follows∫ n
0
s
lx+s
lx
e−rs ds = τ (n)1
∫ n
0
lx+s
lx
e−rs ds
and ∫ τ
0
s
lx+s
lx
e−r0s ds = τ2
∫ τ
0
lx+s
lx
e−r0s ds
2On another time scale a lemming might have a larger EIS.
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respectively. From the expression (24) we see that an increase in the interest
rate r leads to an increase in the optimal consumption later, and a decrease
in the optimal consumption earlier in the individual’s life span, provided the
break-point-in-time t˜ =
(
1
ψ
τ
(n)
1 + (1− 1ψ )τ2
)
is strictly positive. t˜ is seen to
be a convex combination of the two time points τ
(n)
1 and τ2 when ψ ≥ 1,
and when ψ = 1, t˜ = τ
(n)
1 . We conjecture that τ
(n)
1 < τ2 since the pension
age n < τ , but this also depends upon the relation between r and r0. This
means that t˜ = (τ2 − 1ψ
(
τ2 − τ (n)1
)
) is an increasing function of ψ, so that
when ψ increases, t˜ approaches τ2. An individual with a EIS-parameter ψ ≥ 1
will use an increase in the interest rate to save more early when t < t˜, and
accordingly consume more later when t > t˜.
When ψ is smaller than one, an increase in the interest rate will not nec-
essarily have this substitution effect, and the ”income effect” may dominate.
This is of course an important observation related to the insurance indus-
try. According to this result will individuals with ψ ≥ 1 react to an increase
in the interest rate potentially different from an individual with ψ < 1.
This naturally leads to the question of how large the EIS-parameter is for
the representative insurance customer. Below, but primarily in the compan-
ion paper we shall return to this question.
3.5 Including life insurance
It is quite natural to also study life insurance in this framework, where the
goal is to determine the optimal amount of life insurance for an individual.
In other words, the problem is to solve
max
c(t),z
E
{∫ Tx
0
e−δtu(ct)dt+ e−κTxv(z)
}
subject to (i) E
(
W (Tx)e
−rTx) ≥ E(ze−rTx), and (ii) ct ≥ 0 for all t and
z ≥ 0.
The Lagrangian for the problem is (ignoring again the non-negativity
constraints (ii)),
L(c, z;λ) =
∫ τ
0
u(ct)e
− ∫ t0 (δ+µx+s)dsdt+ v(z)(1− κa¯(κ)x )
− λ
(
(1− ra¯(r)x )z −
∫ τ
0
(
e(t)− c(t))e− ∫ t0 (r+µx+s)dsdt).
The first order condition (FOC) in c is the same as for pensions treated
above. The FOC in the amount z of life insurance is obtained by ordinary
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differentiation with respect to the real variable z, which gives
v′(z∗) = λ
1− ra¯(r)x
1− κa¯(κ)x
.
We can thereby determine both the optimal life time consumption, including
pension, and the optimal amount of life insurance. An example will illustrate.
Example 3: (The CEIS consumer.) Assume et is as in (21), the con-
sumption felicity index is u(x) = 1
1−ρx
1−ρ, and the life insurance index is
v(x) = 1
1−θx
1−θ, where ρ and θ are both time preference parameters. The
optimal life insurance amount and optimal consumption/pension are given
by
z∗ = λ−
1
θ
( 1− ra¯(r)x
1− κa¯(κ)x
)− 1
θ
and c∗t = λ
− 1
ρ e
1
ρ
(r−δ)t. (25)
Equality in the ’average’ budget constraint (i) determines the Lagrangian
multiplier λ. The equation that determines λ is
λ−
1
θ (1− ra¯(r)x )
( 1− ra¯(r)x
1− κa¯(κ)x
)− 1
θ
+ λ−
1
ρ a¯(r0)x = y a¯
(r)
x:n¯|. (26)
Notice that with life insurance included, the optimal consumption and the
pension payments become smaller than without life insurance present, which
is seen when comparing the expressions in (25) and (26) with (22). This just
tells us the obvious: When some resources are bound to be set aside for the
beneficiaries, less can be consumed while alive. The optimal amount in life
insurance is an increasing function in income y, and depends on the interest
rate r, the pension age n, the time preference parameter ρ as well as the
impatience rate δ, the bequest time preference parameter θ and the corre-
sponding impatience rate κ, the insured’s age x when initializing the pension
and insurance contracts, and the insured’s life time distribution through the
actuarial formulas in (25) and (26).
Comparative statics in the parameters are not straightforward, and nu-
merical technics may be necessary. As an example, when θ = ρ, it can be seen
that the optimal amount of life insurance z∗(κ) as a function of the bequest
impatience rate κ is increasing for κ ≤ κ0 for some κ0 > 0, and decreasing
in κ for κ > κ0. For reasonable values of κ this means that more impatience
with respect to life insurance means a higher value z∗ of the optimal amount
life insurance. 
The above results deviate rather much from the standard actuarial for-
mulas, which is to be expected since the two approaches are different. The
actuarial theory is primarily based on the principle of equivalence and time
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preference neutrality. This is problematic, since time neutral insurance cus-
tomers would simply not demand any form of pension or life insurance since
this individual can handle time substitution very well on on own account.
Therefore we assume that the individuals have ρ > 0, unlike what is usually
assumed in actuarial theory, and use expected utility as our optimization
criterion for now.
Without going into details, the effect of a partial increase in the interest
rate on the optimal amount of life insurance does not seem to depend on the
parameter ψ being larger than, or smaller than one. Rather does the sign of
the derivative depend upon the level of the interest rate through some factor
(1− rt˜), where t˜ is some positive break-point-in-time. This derivative tends
to be positive when r is small, and negative when r is large. The logic is
the following: A future consumption benefit is more valuable today if the
interest rate is low than if it is high.
Going back to the actuarial relationship (11), the three quantities p, b
and z representing the premium, the pension benefit and the insured amount
respectively can in principle be any non-negative numbers satisfying this re-
lationship. In the above example, all these quantities are in addition derived
so that expected utility is optimized. The optimal contracts still maintain
the actuarial logic represented by the principle of equivalence, which in our
case corresponds to the budget constraint (i) on the ’average’. The present
analogue to the relationship (11) is:∫ n
0
(y − c∗t )
lx+t
lx
e−rtdt =
∫ τ
n
c∗t
lx+t
lx
e−rtdt+ z∗(1− ra¯(r)x ), (27)
where the constant premium p corresponds to the time varying pt = (y− c∗t )
for 0 ≤ t ≤ n, the constant pension benefit b corresponds to the optimal c∗t
for n ≤ t ≤ τ , and the number z corresponds to z∗ found in (25), where also
the optimal pension c∗t is given. So, even if we use another principle than
standard actuarial theory, we agree on the principal structure, represented
by the similarity between (27) and (11).
So far the insured amount is still a deterministic quantity, albeit endoge-
nously derived. The reason for the non-randomness in z∗ in the present
situation is that only biometric risk is considered.
When uncertainty in the financial market is also taken into account, we
shall demonstrate that the optimal insured amount becomes state dependent,
and the same is true for c∗t . Both real and nominal amounts are then of
interest when comparing the results with insurance theory and practice.
Including risky securities in a financial market is our next topic.
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4 The Financial Market
We consider a consumer/insurance customer who has access to a securities
market, as well as a credit market and pension and life insurance as consid-
ered in the above. The securities market can be described by the vector νt of
expected returns of N risky securities in excess of the risk-less instantaneous
return rt, and σt is an N × N matrix of diffusion coefficients of the risky
asset prices, normalized by the asset process, so that σtσ
′
t is the instanta-
neous covariance matrix for asset returns. Both νt and σt are assumed to be
progressively measurable stochastic processes. Here N is also the dimension
of the Brownian motion B.
We assume that the cumulative return process Rnt is an an ergodic process
for each n, where dXnt = X
n
t dR
n
t for n = 1, 2, . . . , N , and X
n
t is the cum
dividend price process of the nth risky asset.
Underlying is a probability space (Ω,F , P ) and an increasing information
filtration Ft generated by the d-dimensional Brownian motion, and satisfying
the ’usual’ conditions. Each price process X
(n)
t is a continuous stochastic
process, and we suppose that σ(0) = 0, so that rt = µ0(t) is the risk-free
interest rate, also a stochastic process. T is the finite horizon of the economy,
so that τ < T . The state price deflator pi(t) is given by
pit = ξte
− ∫ t0 rs ds, (28)
where the ’density’ process ξ has the representation
ξt = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
η′s · dBs −
1
2
∫ t
0
η′s · ηsds
)
. (29)
Here η(t) is the market-price-of-risk for the discounted price processXte
− ∫ t0 rsds,
defined by
σ(ω, t)η(ω, t) = ν(ω, t), (ω, t) ∈ Ω× [0, T ], (30)
where the nth component of νt equals (µn(t)− rt), the excess rate of return
on security n, n = 1, 2, · · · , N . From Ito’s lemma it follows from (29) that
dξt = −ξt η′t · dBt, (31)
i.e., the density ξt is a martingale.
The agent is represented by an endowment process e (income) and a
utility function U : L+ × L+ → R, where
L = {c : ct is progressively measurable, and E(
∫ T
0
c2t dt) <∞}.
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L+, the positive cone of L, is the set of consumption rate processes.
The specific form of the function U is as before, namely the time ad-
ditive and separable one given in (17). Later we change this assumption
and consider recursive utility. The remaining life time Tx of the agent is
assumed independent of the risky securities X. The information filtration Ft
is enlarged to account for events like Tx > t.
This type of situation is called a temporal problem of choice. In such a
situation is is far from clear that the time additive and separable form of U
is the natural representation of preferences (an early reference is here Jan
Mossin (1969)).
4.1 The Consumption/Portfolio Choice
The consumer’s problem is, for each initial wealth level w, to solve
sup
(c,ϕ)
U(c) (32)
subject to an intertemporal budget constraint
dWt =
(
Wt(ϕ
′
t · νt + rt)− ct
)
dt+Wtϕ
′
t · σtdBt, W0 = w. (33)
Here ϕ′t = (ϕ
(1)
t , ϕ
(2)
t , · · · , ϕ(N)t ) are the fractions of total wealth held in the
risky securities. The first order condition for the problem (32) is given by
the Bellman equation:
sup
(c,ϕ)
{D(c,ϕ)J(w, t)− µx(t)J(w, t) + u(c, t)} = 0, (34)
with boundary condition
EJ(w, Tx) = 0, w > 0. (35)
The function J(w, t) is the indirect utility function of the consumer at time
t when the wealth Wt = w, and represents future expected utility at time t
in state w, provided the optimal portfolio choice strategy is being followed
from this time on. The differential operator D(c,ϕ) is given by
D(c,ϕ)J(w, t) = Jw(w, t)(wϕt · νt + rtw − ct) + Jt(w, t) (36)
+
w2
2
ϕ′t · (σt · σ′t) · ϕt Jww(w, t).
The problem as it now stands is a non-standard dynamic programing prob-
lem, a so called non-autonomous problem. Instead of solving this problem
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directly, we solve an equivalent one. As is well known (e.g., Cox and Huang
(1989) or Pliska (1987)), since the market is complete, the dynamic program
(32) - (36) has the same solution as a simpler, yet more general problem,
which we now explain.
Also to be noticed at this point is the following: When uncertainty of
”gambles” being optimized over resolves at dates in the future, after im-
portant decisions must be taken, then use of standard models is suspect
and often quite wrong (e.g., Kreps (1988)). ”Standard models” here mean
the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility representation extended to
several periods in the additive and time-separable way demonstrated in the
above, and also the use of dynamic programming (DP). We know that DP
works for the standard model, bur what if the standard model does not work?
4.2 An Alternative Problem Formulation
The problem is here to find
sup
c∈L
U(c), (37)
subject to
E
{∫ Tx
0
pitct dt
}
≤ E
{∫ Tx
0
pitet dt
}
:= w (38)
Here e is the endowment process of the individual, and it is assumed that et
is Ft-measurable for all t.
As before, the pension insurance element secures the consumer a con-
sumption stream as long as needed, but only if it is needed. This makes it
possible to compound risk-free payments at a higher rate of interest than rt.
The optimal wealth process Wt associated with a solution c
∗ to the prob-
lem (37)-(38) can be implemented by some adapted and allowed trading
strategy ϕ∗, since the marketed subspace M is assumed equal to L (com-
plete markets). Without mortality this is a well-known result in financial
economics.
We claim that by introducing the new random variable Tx this result
still holds: In principal mortality corresponds to a new state of the econ-
omy, which should normally correspond to its own component in the state
price, but the insurer can diversify this type of risk away by pooling over the
agents, all in age x, so that the corresponding addition to the Arrow-Debreu
state price is only the term exp{− ∫ t
0
µx(u)du}, a non-stochastic quantity.
Accordingly, adding the pension insurance contract in an otherwise complete
model has no implications for the state price pi other than multiplication by
this deterministic function, and thus the model is still ’essentially’ complete.
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4.3 The Optimal Consumption/Pension Problem
The constrained optimization problem (37)-(38) can be solved by Kuhn-
Tucker and a variational argument. The Lagrangian of the problem is
L(c;λ) = E
{∫ Tx
0
(
u(ct, t)− λ(pit(ct − et))
)
dt
}
, (39)
We assume that the optimal solution c∗ to the problem (37)-(38) satisfies
c∗t > 0 for a.a. t ∈ [0, Tx), a.s. Then there exists a Lagrange multiplier, λ,
such that c∗ maximizes L(c;λ) and complementary slackness holds.
Denoting the directional derivative of L(c∗;λ) in the ”direction” c ∈ L by
5L(c∗, λ; c), the first order condition of this unconstrained problem becomes
5L(c∗, λ; c) = 0 for all c ∈ L (40)
This is equivalent to
E
{∫ τ
0
((
u′(c∗t )e
−δt − λpit
)
c(t)
)
P (Tx > t)dt
}
= 0, for all c ∈ L, (41)
where the survival probability P (Tx > t) =
l(x+t)
l(x)
. In order for (41) to hold
true for all processes c ∈ L, the first order condition is
u′(c∗t ) = λe
δtpit = λe
−(∫ t0 rsds−δt)ξt a.s., t ≥ 0 (42)
in which case the optimal consumption process is
c∗t = u
′−1
(
λe−(
∫ t
0 rsds−δt)ξt
)
a.s., t ≥ 0, (43)
where the function u′−1(·) inverts the function u′(·). Comparing the first
order condition to the one in (19) where only biometric risk is included, we
notice that the difference is the state price density ξt in (42). Still mortality
does not enter this latter condition.
Differentiation (42) in t along the optimal path c∗t , by the use of Ito’s
lemma and diffusion invariance the following stochastic differential equation
for c∗t is obtained
dc∗t =
(
(rt − δ)T (c∗t ) +
1
2
T 3(c∗t )
u′′′(c∗t )
u′(c∗t )
η′t · ηt
)
dt+ T (c∗t ) η
′
t · dBt (44)
where T (c) is defined before Example 2. Since there is financial risk present,
at first it seems natural to interpret T (·) as the absolute risk tolerance func-
tion and not as EIS · c. A discussion of this issue we return to later.
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Comparing with the corresponding differential equation (20) for c∗t with
only biometric risk present, it is seen that including market risk means that
the dynamic behavior of the optimal consumption is not so crucially depen-
dent upon whether rt < δ at time t or not. This follows since there is an
additional term in the drift, and there is a diffusion term present under mar-
ket risk. Thus the role played by the impatience rate δ is not quite that clear
cut with market risk present as it is with only a risk-free credit market.
Notice that when the market-price-of-risk ηt = 0 of all t ∈ [0, T ] a.s., the
two equations coincide.
Below we consider an example in which the felicity index is the same as
in Example 3. At this stage the standard model would interpret ρ as the
relative risk aversion, call it γ, where ψ = 1/γ has the same interpretation
as for the deterministic model. Thus time substitution and risk aversion are
closely intertwined in the conventional model.
Example 4. (The CRRA/CEIS-consumer.) With the felicity index of Ex-
ample 3, the optimal consumption takes the form
c∗t = (λe
−(∫ t0 rsds−δt)ξt)− 1γ a.s., t ≥ 0. (45)
The budget constraint determines the Lagrange multiplier λ, where mortality
enters. Suppose we consider an endowment process et giving rise to a pension
as in (21). Using Fubini’s theorem this constraint can be written∫ n
0
(
ye−
∫ t
0 rsds
lx+t
lx
− λ− 1γ e− δtγ E(pi(1−
1
γ
)
t )
lx+t
lx
)
dt
+
∫ τ
n
(−1)λ− 1γ e− δtγ E(pi(1−
1
γ
)
t )
lx+t
lx
dt = 0. (46)
For illustration, assume here that the price processes are geometric Brownian
motions, the interest rate r is a constant, and the market price of risk η is
a constant. By the properties of the state prices pit and (28) - (31), it then
follows that
E
(
pi
(1− 1
γ
)
t
)
= e−[(1−
1
γ
)(r+ 1
2
1
γ
η′·η)]t.
Accordingly, the budget constraint can be written
y
∫ n
0
e−rt
lx+t
lx
dt = λ−
1
γ
∫ τ
0
e−[
δ
γ
+(1− 1
γ
)(r+ 1
2
1
γ
η′·η)]t lx+t
lx
dt.
Defining the quantity
r1 = r − 1
γ
(r − δ) + 1
2
1
γ
(1− 1
γ
) η′ · η,
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the Lagrangian multiplier is determined by
λ−
1
γ = y
a¯
(r)
x:n¯|
a¯
(r1)
x
.
From this, the optimal consumption (t ∈ [0, n]) and the optimal pension
(t ∈ [n, τ ]) are both given by the expression
c∗t = y
a¯
(r)
x:n¯|
a¯
(r1)
x
e
1
γ
(r−δ) t ξ
− 1
γ
t for all t ≥ 0. (47)
which can be compared to (22) giving the corresponding process with only
mortality risk present. Notice that this latter formula follows from (47) by
setting η = 0, in which case ξt = 1 for all t (a.s.) and r1 = r0.
The expected value of the optimal consumption is given by
E(c∗t ) = y
a¯
(r)
x:n¯|
a¯
(r1)
x
exp
{1
γ
(
r +
1
2
η′ · η(1 + 1
γ
)− δ)t}, (48)
which is seen to grow with time t (already) when r > δ − 1
2
η′ · η(1 + 1
γ
).
When the opposite inequality holds, this expectation decreases with time. In
terms of expectations, the crucial border value for the impatience rate δ is
no longer r but rather (r + 1
2
η′ · η(1 + 1
γ
)) when a stock market is present.

4.4 Pensions versus ordinary consumption
Now it time we demonstrate why pension insurance exists. This is an exten-
sion of the observation made in Section 2.2 about the effect of pooling in a
deterministic world.
With pension insurance allowed, the actual consumption at each time t in
the life of the consumer is at least as large as the corresponding consumption
when the possibility of ”gambling” on own life length is not allowed, provided
the value of life time consumption w is fixed. This demonstrates a very
concrete effect of pooling with market uncertainty allowed.
To this end, consider the random, remaining life time Tx of an x-year old
as we have worked with all along, and for comparison, the deterministic life
length T , where T = E(Tx) = e¯x is the expected remaining life time of an x-
year old pension insurance customer. For the purpose of this demonstration
the above model works just fine.
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We consider the situation with a CEIS/CRRA-customer with parameter
γ as in Section 4.3, and denote the value of life time consumption w, i.e.,
1
pi0
E
( ∫ Tx
0
pit c
∗
t dt
)
= w.
Using (45) this can be written λ−
1
γ a¯
(r1)
x = w, or
λ
1
γ =
a¯
(r1)
x
w
, (49)
where we have set pi0 = 1 without loss of generality. The corresponding value
of life time consumption w for the deterministic time horizon T is determined
by
1
pi0
E
( ∫ T
0
pit ct dt
)
= w,
where it is assumed that in the two situations the budget constraints are the
same. Again the optimal consumption/pension ct is given in (45), however,
the Lagrange multipliers determining the optimal consumption/pension are
different in the two cases. In order to distinguish, we denote the optimal
consumptions by c∗t and ct, respectively. The multiplier for the situation
with no pension insurance is determined by
λ
− 1
γ
(T )
∫ T
0
e−r1t dt = w,
using Fubini’s theorem, which in actuarial notation is equivalent to
λ
1
γ
(T ) =
a¯
(r1)
T¯ |
w
. (50)
The function a¯
(r1)
t¯| =
∫ t
0
e−r1tdt = 1
r1
(1 − e−r1t) is convex in t, which means
that a¯
(r1)
x = E
( ∫ Tx
0
pit c
∗
t dt
)
= E(a¯
(r1)
T¯x| ) < a¯
(r1)
T¯ | by Jensen’s inequality, since
T = E(Tx). By (49) and (50) this means that λ
1
γ < λ
1
γ
(T ), and using (45) it
follows for all states ω ∈ Ω of the world that
c∗t > ct for all w and for each t ≥ 0, (51)
since the state price density ξt is the same in both cases.
With pension insurance available, the individual obtains a higher con-
sumption rate at each time t that he/she is alive. This demonstrates the
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benefits from pooling when it comes to pensions, and is, presumably, the
original reason for its existence.
When the individual with a deterministic horizon dies, the remaining
wealth remains with the heirs. This wealth is non-negative by assumption.
For the individual with the pension, the remaining wealth at death is dis-
tributed among the other pensioners. The individuals in the pool exhaust
their life time consumption by gambling on own remaining life time.
5 Implications of the conventional model
Here and in the discussion that follows, we intend to illustrate the issues of
intertemporal consumption substitution versus risk aversion. As an alterna-
tive derivation of c∗t in Example 4, the stochastic differential equation (44)
for the optimal consumption process is
dc∗t
c∗t
=
(rt − δ
γ
+
1
2
1
γ
(1 +
1
γ
) η′t · ηt
)
dt+
1
γ
η′t · dBt, (52)
The function T (c) = c
γ
(= ψc). The ”solution” to this stochastic differential
equation is
c∗t = c0e
1
γ
[
∫ t
0 (rs−δ+ 12η′s·ηs)ds+
∫ t
0 η
′
s·dBs], t ≥ 0.
by the Doleans-Dade formula. The initial value c0 is finally determined by the
budget constraint, and (47) would again result in the simple case of constant
r and η, and geometric Brownian motion prices, which would then imply
that the optimal consumption process is also a geometric Brownian motion
as in Example 4.
In society aggregate consumption is observed to be smooth, with a rel-
atively high growth rate, see e.g., Table 1, where the summary statistics of
the data used in the Mehra and Prescott (1985)-paper is presented3. By
σcM(t) we mean the instantaneous covariance rate between the return on
the index S&P-500 and the consumption growth rate, in the model a pro-
gressively measurable, ergodic process. Similarly, σMb(t) and σcb(t) are the
corresponding covariance rates between the index M and government bills b
and between aggregate consumption c and Government bills, respectively. 4.
κM,c(t) is the instantaneous correlation coefficient between the return on the
market index and the consumption growth rate.
3There are of course newer data sets, and for other countries than the US, but they
all retain these basic features. The data is adjusted from discrete-time to continuous-time
compounding.
4These quantities are ”estimated” directly from the original data obtained from Pro-
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Expectation Standard dev. covariances
Consumption growth 1.81% 3.55% σˆMc = .002268
Return S&P-500 6.78% 15.84% σˆMb = .001477
Government bills 0.80% 5.74% σˆcb = −.000149
Equity premium 5.98% 15.95%
Table 1: Key US-data for the time period 1889 -1978. Continuous-time
compounding. κˆM,c = .4033.
In order to match the estimated consumption volatility (3.55 per cent),
from (52) we notice that this can be accomplished by a large enough value of
the risk aversion γ. This is so since the value of the market-price-of-risk ηt is
relatively large, here about .38 and fixed by the summary statistics of Table
1. As it turns out, γ has to be of the order of 26 to match these statistics.
(Here, if d = 1, we interpret σM,c(t) = σM(t)σc(t)κM,c(t).) This leads to a
low value for the EIS parameter ψ. In particular this means that ψ < 1. If
ψ > 1, this does not match the low observed consumption volatility of the
”representative” consumer.
Many examples have been constructed showing that such a high risk
aversion is simply not plausible. Furthermore, an estimate of δ is δˆ = −.015
in order to match the estimated, consumption growth rate of close to two per
cent. Normally we think of the impatience rate as a non-negative quantity,
since human beings are genuinely impatient.
This calibrated values of the preference parameters constitute a pair of
consumption puzzles: The first major, empirical problem with the conven-
tional model is to explain the smooth path of the aggregate consumption
growth rate in society. From (52), where σc(t) = ηt/γ, for the estimated
value of ηt, this requires a large value of γ to match the low estimate of the
consumption volatility.
The second major problem with the conventional model is to explain
the relatively large estimate of the growth rate of aggregate consumption in
society for plausible values of the parameters. For the estimated value of ηt,
and the large value of γ required to match the low estimated volatility, this
requires a very low value of the impatience rate δ in (52), in fact it has to be
negative.
Solving the first problem also solves the second, so there is really one
major puzzle.
The conventional model predicts too large consumption growth volatility,
fessor Rajnish Mehra, using the ergodic assumption, and estimates are denoted by σˆM,c,
etc.
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and too low consumption growth rate for more reasonable values of the pref-
erence parameters. Including pension insurance for the representative agent
does not change this. Consumption substitution is carried out by the con-
tract, and life time consumption is smoothed, but the consumption growth
rate is not. We conclude that the model can not explain well the observed
data.
These two consumption puzzles are of course related to the celebrated
”Equity Premium Puzzle” and the ”Risk Free Rate Puzzle”, see Mehra and
Prescott (1985) and Weil (1989)). With equilibrium imposed, these two sets
of puzzles are in fact identical.
Both the insurance industry and public institutions contribute to comple-
tion of the real world markets, and to consumption substitution during the
life cycles of the citizens. The conventional model can not explain the ob-
served level of smoothing in the consumption growth rate. A major weakness
with this model is that two different abilities of human beings are too tightly
linked together; risk aversion equals time preference, i.e., ρ = γ, or ψ = 1/γ.
In particular, these two properties of an individual should be separated.
The above leads us to consider alternative types of the representation of
preferences. The one we find of particular interest in pension insurance is
recursive utility, which allows us to separate consumption substitution from
risk aversion. The resulting model gives an optimal consumption that in-
volves more smoothing than the present model. As a consequence it fits
much better the summary statistics of Table 1 for reasonable parameter val-
ues. This is the topic of our companion paper.
For an insurance company the implications of the observations from the
present model may be several: In real life companies meet many different
types of customers, demanding different pension insurance contracts. The
above individual is rather extreme, and can not really be taken seriously as
the ”representative customer”. If so, a customer like this individual would
need assistance both in substituting consumption across time, and also in
saving/investment decisions. A defined benefit pension plan would clearly
be appropriate. However, the insurance industry can not tailor make their
contracts to an ”individual” who constitutes an empirical puzzle.
6 Business cycles included
In order to demonstrate how robust the puzzle of the previous section is,
let us assume that the stock market index is a mean reverting process, and
see if this changes anything. Since business cycles exist in the real world,
this will make our model of the market index more realistic. Business cycles
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should somehow be reflected in the data, which a realistic model should also
account for. In Example 4 we made the assumption that the market index
is a geometric Brownian motion.
As a concrete illustration, imagine that the stock market index satisfies
the following dynamic equation
dXt = κt(αt − lnXt)Xtdt+ σM(t)XtdBt (53)
Here κt and αt are two deterministic processes, that could be just constants,
and σM(t) is the volatility of the return rate on the market index, satisfying
usual conditions. The price process Xt is a strictly positive process such that
Yt = lnXt is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU)-process. The mean reversion effect
in this model is higher for large values of Xt than for low. For α, κ and σM
constants, the solution of (53) is
Xt = X0 exp
{(
α− 1
2
σ2M
κ
)(
1− e−κt)+ e−κtσM ∫ t
0
eκsdBs
}
, (54)
in which case
dYt = κ(α− Yt)dt+ σMdBt, (55)
which is the dynamics of an OU-process. In this model the market-price-of-
risk is ηt = (κ(α − lnXt) − rt)/σM(t). Proceeding as in Section 4.3 we now
use the FOC (42) i.e., c∗t = (λe
δtpit)
− 1
γ := f(pi, t), where
dpit = −pit(rtdt+ ηtdBt).
By Ito’s lemma, since
fpi(pi, t) = −1
γ
(c∗t )
(1+γ)λeδt, fpi,pi(pi, t) =
1
γ
(
1
γ
+ 1)(c∗t )
(1+2γ)λ2e2δt and
ft(pi, t) = − δ
γ
c∗t ,
this gives
dc∗t
c∗t
=
(rt − δ
γ
+
1
2
1
γ
(1 +
1
γ
) η′t · ηt
)
dt+
1
γ
η′t · dBt. (56)
This is equation (44) with the present market-price-of-risk η and the present
risk tolerance function T . As can be seen, this is also the same equation for
the optimal consumption c∗t as (52), again with the present process ηt. Since
ηt =
κt(αt − lnXt)− rt
σM(t)
=
µM(t)− rt
σM(t)
, (57)
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where µM(t) = κt(αt − lnXt) is the return rate of the market index, the
consumption puzzle with mean reversion is seen to be the same as the cor-
responding puzzle with geometric Brownian motion in Example 4.
Since no distributional assumptions were made in equation (44), we could
equally well have taken this equation as a starting point for our present
investigation. In other words, the consumption puzzle remains for the present
set of preferences regardless of the form of the drift and diffusion terms of X
so long as these satisfy standard conditions for existence of solutions of the
corresponding stochastic differential equations.
Another question is the impact of business cycles on welfare. This has
been the topic of much research over the last 40 years. This cycle around
the secular trend has negative impact on consumer welfare. Suppressing it,
i.e., smoothing out the business cycles, would be beneficial to consumers who
dislike consumption fluctuations around the optimal growth rate µc(t)
5. As
mentioned, the insurance industry can contribute by making reserves in good
times, i.e., by time diversification.
A last point: From analyses in the frequency domain (e.g., Dew-Becker
and Giglio (2013)), we know that for the standard power utility the only thing
that determines the price of risk for a shock is how it affects consumption
today, while under standard recursive utility long-run risks matter. Recall
that the negative shock of the finance crisis in 2007 had a longer lasting
effect on consumption than just one year, which is more in line with the
latter preference specification. However, much remains to be done in this
direction.
7 Discussion of the optimal pension
Abstracting from the consumption puzzle on the aggregate level, the model
is still considered to give interesting results on an individual level for many
other issues.
We choose to refer to risk preference instead of time preference, but as
we saw previously, we must be keenly conscientious about the difference.
Observe that when stock market uncertainty is present, since γ > 0, the
solution in (45) tells us that when state prices pit are low, optimal consumer
is high, and vice versa. State prices reflect what the representative consumer
is willing to pay for an extra unit of consumption; in particular it is convenient
to think of pit high in ”times of crises” and low in ”good times”.
5This property of the consumer has to do with time preference, defined as ψ−1. Ideally
this should be different from risk aversion γ.
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In real terms this property of pensions is the same as for optimal con-
sumption. In times of crises the pensions are lower than in good times. This
merely explains the intrinsic logic of this treatment, namely that society can
only pay the pensioners what the economy can manage at each time. To
the extent that this also happens in real life, this is partly a consequence of
the way insurance companies and governments manage resources by yearly
budgets.
Insurance companies, for example, pay the pensions from funds, which in
bad times are lower than in good times. Such companies have the possibility
and ability, however, to take a long term view and build reserves in good
times, thereby smoothing premium reserves across time.
With this perspective in mind, insurance companies could consider pro-
viding the type of pension and life insurance contracts that many people
seem to prefer, namely that of smoothing life time consumption across both
time, and states of nature. Since individuals have a shorter time perspective
than the insurance industry, individuals can not ”time diversify” the way the
industry can. Again this is an argument for pooling, but more that that: An
insurance company can interchange time integrals with state integrals under
ergodicity (The Gibbs Conjecture) better than an individual.
Ordinary state pensions are paid out each year to the whole generation
of pensioners. If this is done on a year by year basis with yearly budget con-
straints, this will naturally lead to real fluctuations in benefits. If aggregate
consumption in society is down in one particular year, everyone is in principle
worse off, simply by the mutuality principle. This appears very different if
also governments chose to take a long term view and smooth across time as
well as over the states of nature, something a government should be able to
accomplish, and many nations actually do this to a certain degree. A deeper
discussion of this topic would lead us into business cycles, fiscal policy and
macroeconomics, which is beyond the scope of this presentation (see e.g.,
Rodden et. al. (2003)).
7.1 Comparative statics
In Section 3 we considered what happens to consumption, in a pure credit
market with only mortality risk when, for example, the interest rate increases.
In the present we have the possibility to investigate what happens to con-
sumption when conditions in the market for risky assets change. Such partial
analyses may have limited validity, since the actual capital market should be
in some sort of equilibrium. In such an environment an increase in, for exam-
ple, the market-price-of-risk may stem from increased uncertainty in relation
to the aggregate consumption in society, which in its turn will lower the
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equilibrium interest rate.
At the risk of violating such principles, let us nevertheless consider the
partial effect on the expected value of the optimal consumption at time t, as
seen from time t = 0, of an increase in the market-price-of-risk. For simplicity
of exposition we assume there to be only one risky asset (N = 1), where σt,
νt and rt are all deterministic and constant in time. We then get
∂E(c∗t )
∂η
= y
a¯
(r)
x:n¯|
a¯
(r1)
x
exp
{1
γ
(
r +
1
2
η′ · η(1 + 1
γ
)− δ)t} η 1
γ
(1 +
1
γ
)(t− t˜1), (58)
where
t˜1 =
1
γ
− 1
1
γ
+ 1
t˜2
and t˜2 is determined by the equality∫ τ
0
s
lx+s
lx
e−r1s ds = t˜2
∫ τ
0
lx+s
lx
e−r1s ds
by the first mean value theorem for integrals. We notice that only when the
parameter γ ≤ 1, or ψ ≥ 1, is the break-point-in-time t˜1 ≥ 0, in which case
the expected consumption decreases for t ≤ t˜1 and increases for t > t˜1 with an
increase in η, ceteris paribus. This should be compared to the substitution
effect in Example 2, and must be attributed to the EIS-interpretation of
ψ = 1/γ. When ψ < 1 on the other hand, an increase in the market-price-
of-risk η leads to an increase in the expected consumption for all t > 0, and
there is no transparent substitution between consumption early and late in
life. The income effect then dominates.
An increase in η could also mean a decrease in the volatility σ in the stock
market (recall that σMη = (µM − r)), in which case more is invested in the
stock market relative to the bond market. The individual with γ < 1 would
then invest, consume less earlier and more later. The risk averse individual
with γ > 1 would miss this opportunity, according to the standard model.
7.2 Pensions in nominal terms
Pensions (and insurance payments) are usually not made in real, but in
nominal terms. There exist index-linked contracts, but these are still more
the exception than the rule. In nominal terms the optimal consumption is
given by c∗tpit.
For the model of Example 4, the nominal pension is
c∗tpit = (λe
δt)−
1
γ pi
(1− 1
γ
)
t .
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Here the value γ = ψ = 1 is again seen to be a border value of these two
parameters in the sense that for γ > 1 (ψ < 1) both optimal consumption
and pensions in nominal terms are countercyclical. This can give rise to an
illusion of being insured against times of crises.
People with γ < 1 (ψ > 1) experience no such illusion, since nominal
amounts behave as real amounts with respect to cycles in the economy. In
the situation when 0 < γ < 1 the agent is sometimes called risk tolerant.
Notice that when γ = 1 the nominal consumption does not vary with the
state price pit and is in addition deterministic.
The optimal pension problem has no solution unless the agent is risk
averse, i.e., γ > 0.
Independent studies indicate a range of γ from zero to ten, where a value
between one half and three is considered both moderate and plausible6.
8 The connection to actuarial theory and in-
surance practice
In standard actuarial theory the nominal pension is nonrandom, at least this
is what most textbooks on the subject take as a premise. Referring to the
above standard theory, this is only consistent with γ = 1, corresponding
to logarithmic utility, the case when the substitution effect and the income
effect cancel in the standard model. In addition this theory commonly uses
the principle of equivalence to price insurance contracts, where the state price
density implicitly is set equal to a constant, i.e., ξt ≡ 1. This implies that
the agent is really risk neutral, so γ = 0 follows, and the conventional model
breaks dow. Thus there seems to be an inconsistency between the standard
life cycle model and actuarial text-book theory.
In insurance practice, which actuaries are primarily engaged in, let us
again distinguish between the two main types of contracts; (a) defined ben-
efits, and (b) defined contributions. With regard to the first, before possible
profit sharing the nominal value is usually taken to be constant in the insur-
ance contracts, although as we have noticed, sometimes contracts are offered
where the real value is approximately constant. A deterministic contract is
not consistent with any finite value of γ for the standard model.
Attached to this contract is usually a return rate guarantee. Many life
insurance companies are having difficulties with this guarantee in times when
6It may be of interest to notice that Kimball et.al. (2008) indicate a value of the relative
risk aversion between 3 and 8, based on responses to hypothetical income gambles in the
Health and Retirement Study, a large-scale US-survey.
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the stock market is down. Lately, in times of crises, this tends to go together
with a low interest rate (like in the financial crisis of (2007, - )) due to govern-
ment interference. In such cases life insurance companies suffer twofold, and
must rely on built-up reserves before, possibly, equity is being used. These
problems seem closely connected to a regulatory regime with focus on yearly
performance, for contracts that are intrinsically long term.
Defined contribution contracts are actively marketed by the insurance
companies at the present. For such contracts the insurance customers take
all the financial risk, and mainly mortality risk remains with the companies.
There is no rate of return guarantees, and the contract functions much like
unit linked pension contract, or simply like a mutual fund. Thus the nominal,
as well as the real pensions are state dependent, in accordance with the
basic theory outlined above. In neither case does a guaranteed return enter
the optimal pension contract. A guarantee affects the insurance company’s
optimal portfolio choice plan. Typically, due to the nature of the guarantees
and regulatory constraints, the companies are led to sell when the market
goes down, and buy when the market rises. With a constant market volatility,
this is just the opposite of what is known to be optimal, to be discussed later.
However, typically market volatility increases in crises, in which case it may
be optimal to sell.
Guarantees seem attractive to customers for a variety of reasons, so such
contracts are not likely to disappear from the market: By the principle of
dynamic consistency, if there is some product that enough people want, even-
tually there will be a market for this product. Insurers are reluctant to offer
such contracts at the present, but this may well change in the future.
There are different reasons why guarantees originated in the life and pen-
sion insurance business. In Norway, as the story goes, it became part of the
legal terms of the contracts, more or less by an oversight, in times where the
short term interest rate was considerably higher that the 4% that was gener-
ally employed in the premium calculations on which the standard actuarial
tables were based. Also demand from customers likely played a role.
During the financial crisis of 2007 and onwards, casual observations seem
to suggest that many individuals would rather prefer the defined benefit type
to the other. As an example7, the employees of a life and pension insurance
company would rather prefer a collective defined benefit pension plan, but
were voted down by the board. Collective pension plans organized by firms
on behalf of their workers, are almost exclusively defined contribution plans
these days (at least in Norway), which appear to be the least costly of the
two for the firms, and also the preferred choice to offer by the insurance
7a case known to the author
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companies at the present.
In times of crises, defined benefit pension contracts seem most attractive
to the customers, at least as long as they ignore the possibility that their in-
surance company may go bankrupt. In the crisis referred to above, some life
insurance companies failed. However, a great number of individuals through-
out the world lost parts of, or even their entire pensions due to the fall in the
stock market, for holders of defined contribution pension plans. In times of
rising stock prices, on the other hand, such contracts may seem attractive to
many individuals. What alternative the individuals find best may thus seem
to depend upon where in the business cycle an individual happens to retire.
In isolation, this does not seem like a sound principle.
In practice, when a pension insurance customer approaches retirement
age, the financial risk of the individual’s premium reserve is gradually de-
creased by the company to avoid these kind of problems.
In the next section we present a simple one-period model that points in
the same direction.
9 A simple one-period model. The ”time-
less” case.
In real life consumers are likely to separate consumption decisions from pen-
sions. A reasonable pension may then, at least partly, be regarded as an
insurance against a bad state in the economy when the consumer retires.
In this regard it may be useful to return to the standard actuarial model
of Section 2.1, where equation (8) prescribes a fixed yearly pension b, when
optimal consumption is taken as given. In the present setting where market
risk is included, in order to obtain a insurance effect of a pension we should,
perhaps, bring in insurance companies explicitly in the model and consider
Pareto optimal risk sharing, but that is beyond the scope of the present
presentation.
What we choose to focus on is the following. Consider the insurance
problem in the simple setting of a one-period model (a timeless problem). Let
W be the state dependent wealth at time one (which is also the consumption
then) without pension insurance. Suppose the pension insurance buyer can
purchase a pension contract specifying the amount Y to be paid out at time
one at a premium p paid at time zero. Here the pension amount Y = Y (ω) is
also state dependent seen from time zero. The state price in the economy is
denoted by pi, a random variable, and here taken as exogeneous. The optimal
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pension amount Y is then a solution of the following problem,
maxYEu(W +Y − p) subject to E
(
pi · (W +Y − p)) ≤ E(pi · W). (59)
Here the inequality is the agent’s budget constraint and the utility function
u satisfies u′ > 0, u′′ < 0. The Lagrangian of the problem (59) is
L(Y ;λ) = E(u(W + Y − p)− λpi · (Y − p)).
The directional derivative of the Lagrangian at the optimal Y , denoted by
Y ∗, in the direction Z is
5L(Y ∗;λ;Z) = E
(( ∂u
∂Y
(W + Y ∗ − p)− λpi)Z).
The first order condition is then
5L(Y ∗;λ;Z) = 0 in all ’directions’ Z ∈ L2,
which implies that
u′(Y ∗ +W − p) = λpi
or
Y ∗ = (u′)−1(piλ)− (W − p) a.s. (60)
This equation tells us that the optimal pension amount is negatively corre-
lated with random endowment W . As we have pointed out, this is a desirable
property of a pension insurance. Since the budget constraint is obtained with
equality (u′ > 0), the premium p = E(piY ∗).
Normally the consumption endowment W results from savings in the
security market, and if this is done in an ’optimal’ way W is negatively
correlated with the state price pi as earlier explained. Under risk aversion,
the inverse function of u′ is a decreasing function. This means that when
the state price pi increases, and consequently (W − p) decreases, on the
average, the term (u′)−1(piλ) decreases, and the term −(W − p) increases,
on the average. As a consequence the positive correlation between Y ∗ and
the security market is reduced, which is what risk averse pension customers
presumably want. Notice that for timeless problems the Eu-theory seems to
work just fine.
10 Including Life Insurance
10.1 The conventional model
We are now in position to analyze life insurance in the setting of the life
cycle model. The contracts we derive here are idealizations. The results may
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give useful information to the life insurance industry about what contracts
to offer.
We assume that the felicity index u and the utility function v are as in
Example 3 of Section 3.1. The problem can then be formulated as follows:
max
z,c≥0
E
{∫ Tx
0
e−δt
1
1− γ c
1−γ
t dt+ e
−κTx 1
1− θz
1−θ
}
subject to
E
{
e−rTxW (Tx)
}
≥ E
{
piTxz
}
,
where z is the amount of life insurance, here a random decision variable. The
Lagrangian of the problem is:
L(c, z;λ) = E
{∫ τ
0
e−δt
1
1− γ c
1−γ
t
lx+t
lx
dt+ e−κTx
1
1− θz
1−θ
− λ[piTxz − ∫ τ
0
(et − ct) lx+t
lx
dt
]}
.
The first order condition in c is:
5cL(c∗, z∗;λ; c) = 0, ∀c ∈ L+
which is equivalent to
E
{∫ τ
0
(
(c∗t )
−γe−δt − λpit
)
ct
lx+t
lx
dt
}
= 0, ∀c ∈ L+
and this leads to the optimal consumption/pension
c∗t =
(
λeδtpit
)− 1
γ a.s. t ≥ 0
as we have seen before in (45). The first order condition in the amount of
life insurance z is:
5zL(c∗, z∗;λ; z) = 0, ∀z ∈ L+
which is equivalent to
E
{(
(z∗)−θe−κTx − λpiTx
)
z
}
= 0, ∀z ∈ L+ (61)
Notice that both z∗ and z are F ∨σ(Tx) - measurable. For (61) to hold true,
it must be the case that
z∗ =
(
λeκTxpi(Tx)
)− 1
θ a.s., (62)
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showing that the optimal amount of life insurance z∗ is a state dependent
FTx - measurable quantity.
One may wonder which of time preference or risk preference is the correct
interpretation of the parameters θ and γ. (This will be clear once we turn to
recursive utility.)
If the state is relatively good at the time of death, the state price piTx is
then low and (piTx)
− 1
θ is relatively high (when θ > 0). Thus this life insurance
contract covaries positively with the business cycle. In practice this could be
implemented by linking the payment z∗ to an equity index.
One can again wonder how desirable this positive correlation with the
economy is. For optimal consumption we found it quite natural, but not so for
pensions. Similarly, life insurance possess the characteristics of an ordinary,
(non-life) insurance contact. In some cases it may seem reasonable that a life
insurance contract is countercyclical to the economy, thereby providing real
insurance in time of need. For this to be the result, however, the function
v must be convex, corresponding to risk proclivity which here means that
θ < 0, but risk loving people do not buy insurance.
The expected value of z∗ is found by conditioning, assuming that ν, η
and r are all deterministic constants. It is given by the formula
E(z∗) = λ−
1
θ
∫ τ
0
exp
{1
θ
(
r +
1
2
η′ · η(1 + 1
θ
)− κ)t} lx+t
lx
dt. (63)
For a given value of budget constraint (λ), this expectation is seen to be
larger if r + 1
2
η′ · η(1 + 1
θ
) > κ than if the opposite inequality holds. As for
pensions, in terms of expectation has the impatience cutt-off-point increased
from r to (r + 1
2
η′ · η(1 + 1
θ
)). In other words, not only the market interest
rate r, but also the market-price-of-risk and the relative risk aversion of the
function v determines what it means to be impatient, when a stock market
is present.
Using the budget constraint with equality, we find an equation for the
Lagrange multiplier λ;
E
{
piTxz
∗ −
∫ τ
0
(et − c∗t )pit
lx+t
lx
dt
}
= 0.
With a constant income of y up to the time n of retirement, and an optimal
pension c∗t thereafter as in (21), we obtain the equation
λ−
1
θ (1− r2a¯(r2)x ) + λ−
1
γ a¯(r1)x = ya¯
(r)
x:n¯|,
where
r1 = r − 1
γ
(r − δ) + 1
2
η′ · η 1
γ
(1− 1
γ
)
35
as in Section 4.3, and
r2 = r − 1
θ
(r − κ) + 1
2
η′ · η 1
θ
(1− 1
θ
).
In the special situation where κ = δ and θ = γ so that u = v, it follows that
r1 = r2 and
λ−
1
γ =
ya¯
(r)
x:n¯|
(1 + (1− r1)a¯(r1)x )
.
It is at this point that pooling takes place in the contract. In this situation
the optimal consumption/pension is given by
c∗t =
ya¯
(r)
x:n¯|
(1 + (1− r1)a¯(r1)x )
e((r−δ)/γ)t ξ
− 1
γ
t , (64)
and the optimal amount of life insurance at time Tx of death of the insured
is
z∗ =
ya¯
(r)
x:n¯|
(1 + (1− r1)a¯(r1)x )
e((r−δ)/γ)Tx ξ
− 1
γ
Tx
. (65)
This means that the optimal amount of life insurance is determined jointly,
through the constant λ, with the optimal consumption/pension.
We claim that these contracts represent an innovation in the theory of
ordinary life insurance.
In both (64) and (65) the risk aversion parameter γ appears. In the
recursive model, we shall se that this interpretation is only reasonable in
the last formula regarding life insurance. Thus pensions have to do with
consumption substitution, life insurance with risk attitudes.
10.2 Discussion of state dependent life insurance con-
tracts
If large parts of the population buy life insurance products, a positive corre-
lation with the business cycle is a natural property of the life cycle model.
If we introduce insurance companies, this corresponds to no building of re-
serves. Unlike pension insurance, however, life insurance is a product that
not everybody seems to demand. We can single out two different family
situations where life insurance is of particular interest. The first concerns
a relatively young family with small children. Then one of the parents can
usually not work full time, which means that the other is the main provider.
If this person dies, in for example an accident, this is of course dramatic for
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this family. Life insurance then plays the role of insurance for the loss of
the remaining life time income. As can be seen from the expression in (65),
the insured amount is proportional to the present value at time zero of life
time income ya¯
(r)
x:n¯|. If death comes early, Tx is relatively small so the factor
e((r−δ)/γ)Tx is close to one.
The other situation we have in mind is the traditional one with a bequest
motive, usually meaning that an older person wants to transfer money to
his or her heirs. The social need for this insurance may seem less obvious
than in the first situation described. Here the factor e((r−δ)/γ)Tx may be large
for the patient life insurance customer, implying a large insured sum to the
beneficiaries. Despite of all the good reasons for a life insurance contract for
the young family, its seems far less widespread than life insurance with the
bequest motive, which is somewhat ironic.
In climate economics the bequest idea could be interesting in the following
sense. By paying a premium today (e.g., by reducing consumption and utility
now), one may ”roll over” a more sustainable society to future generations
by ”inter-personal transfers”.
One objection to the optimal solutions (62) and (65) is that the amount
payable has not been subject to ”enough pooling” over the individuals. The
pooling element is present, since it is used in the budget constraints, but the
amount payable is here crucially dependent on the actual time of death Tx
of the insured, which is unusual in both life insurance theory and practice.
Focusing on the standard model, one alternative approach is to integrate
out mortality in the first order condition (61). Notice that this is strictly
speaking not the correct solution to the optimization problem, but must
instead be considered as a suboptimal pooling approximation. This results
in the following approximative first order condition:
Ez,z∗
{(
(z∗)−γ(1− δa¯(δ)x )− λ
∫ τ
0
pitfx(t)dt
)
z
}
= 0, ∀z,
assuming again that κ = δ and θ = γ. The solution to this problem, also a
random variable, is given by
z¯∗ =
(λ ∫ τ
0
ξte
−rtfx(t)dt
1− δa¯(δ)x
)− 1
γ
a.s. (66)
However, this contract is seen to depend on the state of the economy from
time 0 when the insured is in age x, to the end of the insured’s horizon
τ . At time of death Tx (< τ) this quantity is not entirely known, which is
a consequence of our approximative procedure. Ignoring this information
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problem for the moment, by employing the budget constraint, the Lagrange
multiplier λ is found as
λ−
1
γ =
ya¯
(r)
x:n¯|
a¯
(r1)
x +
E[(
∫ τ
0 ξte
−rtfx(t)dt)
(1− 1γ )]
(1−δa¯(δ)x )−
1
γ
(67)
Inserting λ from (67) into (66), the suboptimal insured amount results.
When stock market uncertainty goes to zero, i.e., when ξt → 1 a.s., z¯∗
converges to the corresponding contract of Section 3.1 when only biometric
risk is present.
We can derive an insured amount z∗∗ that is consistent with the infor-
mation available at time of death of the insured as the following conditional
expectation
z∗∗ := E{z¯∗|FTx}.
This is a random variable at the time when the life insurance contract is
initialized, and an observable quantity at the time of death of the insured,
and thus solves the information problem.
Note that this contract would benefit the young family in the case of early
death of the provider, since those who die early are subsidized by those who
live long when the insured sum is subject to enough averaging.
The advantage with this contract is that it takes into account pooling over
life contingencies at two stages of the analysis. Furthermore it is consistent
with the standard analysis when there is ”no market risk in the limit”.
11 The optimal portfolio choice problem
We have barely touched upon the portfolio choice problem in Section 4.1, but
could there proceed without really having to solve it. This is due to the fact
that in the model we discuss, we may separate the the consumer’s portfolio
choice problem from his or her optimal consumption choice. In the present
section we do solve the investment problem explicitly. For this we need the
agent’s net wealth Wt at time t. For the CRRA-consumer of the standard
model, it is given by
Wt =
1
pit
Et
{∫ Tx
t
pisc
∗
sds
}
=
1
pit
Et
{∫ Tx
t
pi
(1− 1
γ
)
s λ
− 1
γ e−
δ
γ
sds
}
,
where we have used (45). Here Et means conditional expectation given the
information filtration Ft ∨ (Tx > t), i.e., given the financial information
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available at time t and the fact that the individual is alive then. Recalling
that at time t the agent is in age x+ t, we get, using Fubini’s theorem
Wt =
1
pit
λ−
1
γ
∫ τ
t
Et(pi
(1− 1
γ
)
s ) e
− δ
γ
s lx+s
lx+t
ds.
Provided σt = σ, νt = ν and rt = r are all deterministic constants, the
conditional expectation appearing in the integrand is computed as follows:
Et(pi
(1− 1
γ
)
s ) = Et
(
pi
(1− 1
γ
)
t e
(1− 1
γ
)(−r− 1
2
η′·η)(s−t)+(1− 1
γ
)η′·(Bs−Bt)) =
pi
(1− 1
γ
)
t e
−[(1− 1
γ
)r+ 1
2
1
γ
(1− 1
γ
)η′·η](s−t),
where we have used the lognormal representation for the state price pi and
the moment generating function of the normal distribution. This gives for
the wealth process
Wt = pi
− 1
γ
t λ
− 1
γ e−
δ
γ
t a¯
(r1)
x+t = c
∗
t a¯
(r1)
x+t, (68)
where r1 is as given in Section 4.3. This shows that the wealth at any time
t in the life of the consumer, who is then in age (x + t), is equal to the
actuarial value of receiving the optimal consumption c∗t per time unit for the
rest of his or her life, discounted at the rate r1. For logarithmic utility, r1 = δ
the subjective interest rate; when γ 6= 1 this discount rate depends on the
volatility of the state prices, or the market price of risk η, δ, r as well as of
γ. In fact, r1 can be interpreted as the a risk adjusted return rate.
Using the dynamics for c∗t given in (47), by Ito’s lemma we obtain the
following dynamic representation for the wealth Wt:
dWt = µW (t)dt+
1
γ
Wtη · dBt,
for some drift term µW (t). Comparing this to the intertemporal budget
constraint (33) of Section 4.1, we may apply diffusion invariance to determine
the the optimal fractions ϕ′t = (ϕ
(1)
t , ϕ
(2)
t , · · · , ϕ(N)t ) of total wealth held in
the risky securities at each time t. By equating the two diffusion terms, we
obtain that
1
γ
η = ϕt · σ.
and recalling that ση = ν, it follows from this that the optimal investment
fractions are
ϕ =
1
γ
(σσ′)−1ν, (69)
39
where ν, with components νn = µn − r, n = 1, 2, · · ·N , is the vector of risk
premiums for the N risky securities. These ratios are all seen to be constants,
meaning that they do not depend upon the age (x + t) of the investor, the
state of the economy pi, or on the investor’s death intensity µx+t.
This result is the same as the one found by Mossin (1968), Samuelson
(1969) and Merton (1971) without pension insurance present. A random
time horizon simply does not alter this result.
The formula (69) basically tells us that when prices of stocks increase, it is
optimal to sell, and when prices fall it is optimal to buy, provided volatilities
do not change. From an insurance perspective companies are often led to do
the opposite, as we have mentioned before, which is of course unsatisfactory.
However, in times of crises the volatility of the stock market index typically
increases, in which case the optimal fraction in the index goes down.
In the formula (69) it is customary that γ is interpreted as relative risk
aversion, and 1/γ is relative risk tolerance. The EIS-interpretation of ψ =
1/γ does not appear relevant in this connection.
One objection to result (69) is that the optimal strategy does not depend
upon the investor’s horizon. This is against empirical evidence, and also
against the typical recommendations of portfolio managers and insurance
companies. The typical advice is that as the horizon gets shorter, the investor
should gradually go out of equities, and thus take on less financial risk. This
issue we present a short discussion of in the next section.
Another objection about this model is that under our assumptions about
deterministic σt, νt and rt this model implies that the volatility of the con-
sumption growth rate σc is equal the volatility σW of the return rate on the
wealth portfolio Wt. Thus, from Table 1 we notice that the market portfolio
can not be a proxy for the wealth portfolio under these assumptions.
12 The horizon problem
In this part we examine the effect of horizon and wealth on portfolio choice.
We assume that the felicity index u(x, t) satisfies the following
u(x, t) =
{
1
1−γ(t)x
(1−γ(t))e−δt, if γ(t) 6= 1;
ln(x)e−δt, if γ(t) = 1.
(70)
where γ : [0, τ) → R+ is a continuous and strictly positive function of time.
Notice that in this case u(x, t) is not time and state separable, but this is the
only relaxation of the standard assumptions that is done. Using this assump-
tion, Aase (2009) shows that under this assumption the optimal fractions in
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the risky assets are
ϕ(t) =
1
γ(t˜t)
(σσ′)−1ν, (71)
where t˜t is an Ft−measurable random time satisfying t˜t ∈ (t, τ). It is deter-
mined at each time t by the equation
γ(t˜t) =
∫ τ
t
g(s, t)ds∫ τ
t
g(s, t) 1
γ(s)
ds
:=
Wt
Zt
. (72)
Here Wt is the agent’s optimal wealth at time t, given by equation
Wt =
∫ τ
t
(
λeδs
)− 1
γ(s)pi
− 1
γ(s)
t
exp
{
−
(
r +
1
2
1
γ(s)
η′ · η
)(
1− 1
γ(s)
)(
s− t)} l(x+ s)
l(x+ t)
ds. (73)
Notice that when the function γ(t) ≡ γ, then the wealth in this equation
becomes the same as the wealth in (68), as the case should be. Clearly the
quantity Zt can be computed from the expression for Wt in (73) and the
function γ(t).
The consequences of this result are several, and the above reference gives
the details. Here we only point out that if the risk aversion function γ(t) is
increasing with time, this result implies that individuals should invest more
in the risky asset when they have a longer horizon, i.e., when they are young,
and gradually move into bonds as they grow older. This is then in agreement
with both advice from investment professionals, and with empirical studies
of actual behavior.
It seems natural, with this assumption, that the investor should pick some
average time in the remaining horizon when deciding on today’s portfolio
choice.
The horizon problem should, perhaps, be formulated in the mean revert-
ing setting of Section 6, since one concern is what happens when retirement
takes place in a slump. The technical side of this problem has been con-
sidered in Benth and Karlsen (2005), where the result presented is rather
complicated, but the optimal ratio in the risky asset depends on the horizon.
Another situation is when, in the the standard model, there is a bequest
utility function v different from u. Time dependence can then arise in the
optimal portfolio solution as well.
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13 A second portfolio choice puzzle
In connection with the optimal portfolio choice result (69), there is also
another empirical puzzle. Again we refer to the study of Mehra and Prescott
(1985) of the US-economy for the period of 1889-1978, where the data are
summarized in Table 1.
Based on the conventional, pure demand theory of Section 11, by assum-
ing a relative risk aversion of around two, the optimal fraction in equity is
119% follows from the standard formula (69), using the summary statistics
of Table 1, and assuming one single risky asset, the index itself. In contrast,
depending upon estimates, the typical household holds between 6% to 20%
in equity. Conditional on participating in the stock market, this number
increases to about 40% in financial assets.
One could object to this that the conventional model is consistent with
a value for γ around 26 only. Using this value instead, the optimal fraction
in equity is down to around 7%, which in isolation is reasonable. However,
such a high value for the relative risk aversion is considered implausible, as
we have discussed before.
This is a problem where the recursive model gives much more reasonable
results, see Aase (2014a).
14 Longevity and cohort risk.
We round off by discussing some issues that do not directly come as a result
of the above analysis, but which are related to problems commonly discussed
in connection with pensions.
In comparing longevity risk with cohort risk, it is tempting to dismiss the
latter as not being of such fundamental importance as the former. By cohort
risk is meant that some periods have larger numbers of retired people than
other periods. This is a transient phenomenon that will eventually pass away,
and not a structural one, as longevity risk. Of course, when these two risks
materialize at the same time, this causes extra problems for any nation’s
welfare programs. This seems to be the case in many western countries
when the large broods borne right after World War II become pensioners. In
addition these cohorts tend to live longer than the generations before them.
In some countries the actuarial tables are modified every year, like in
Canada, in other countries the same tables as were constructed in 1963 were
still used in 2009, like in Norway. The theory in this paper assumes that
the tables capture the real mortality risk, and pooling works so that there is
no economic risk premium associated with mortality. As long as the proper
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measures have been taken regarding reserving for longevity risk, there should
be few problems for the private insurance industry with respect to either of
these two types of risk.
For government welfare programs, the situation is of course different.
Many developed countries have a social security system that pays a basic
pension to its citizens. This is usually independent of what the individuals
have arranged in terms of pensions from the insurance industry. In Norway,
for example, the country that I know best, the government pensions are
determined by the principle of ”pay as you go”. For those only acquainted
with the premium reserving of private or mutual insurance companies, this
may not look like a sound principle. In the parliament (Stortinget) the
politicians determine a basic amount each year, called one G upon which
the pensions are based. In 2010 the size of G = NoK 75.641, corresponding
to USD 13.000. The more registered work effort an individual has put in,
and the higher the salary, the higher the pension. Consider the incentives:
By and large this arrangement means that the daughters and sons of the
beneficiaries determine the benefits. Thus the ”weak” part - the pensioners
- seem protected, or at least, they get what they ”deserve”. Second, what
about economic sustainability? Since all pensions are determined from the
basic amount G, by making this amount state dependent, matters can be
arranged such that the nation each year pays the pensions it can afford. As
we have mentioned earlier, here nations are in addition able to carry out
some sort of time diversification on the aggregate level.
In practice, to set G lower one year than the previous year may require
a great deal of political determination and courage, which means that the
system represents no guarantee that the nation will not consume beyond its
means. Here rules rather than discretion may be the solution.
In addition to this basic pension from the government, and possible pri-
vate pensions with the insurance industry, in many countries there are pen-
sions also from the employers. These collective pensions are usually arranged
between the employers and private insurers. The pensions depend upon how
long an employee has been with the company, what the salary has been, and
the premium reserve moves with the worker as he or she changes jobs.
The two types of risk, longevity risk and cohort risk, are problematic for
governments’ welfare schemes. One solution has been pointed out in a recent
report8. By increasing the pensionable age by a few years, the projected
increase in the state’s pension expenses may be mitigated. In particular this
report claims that by increasing the pension age by two years, this increases
the state’s income of about four per cent of GDP for the case of Norway. For
8http://www.dn.no/forsiden/borsMarked/article2029034.ece
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an average working period of 40 years, an increase of two years means that
the total work effort is society has increased by five per cent. In other words,
society can become five per cent richer if people work two more years.
This suggestion has of course its weaknesses, since for once it ”assumes
away” unemployment, which is not negligible in many western countries. It
is therefore also likely to be controversial. That it is politically difficult, we
know from protests and demonstrations in 2010 and later in countries like
Greece, Ireland, France, Portugal, Spain, etc. However, it is no secret that
some countries seem to have more ”slack” than others. As an illustration,
in Table 2 is shown the employment frequency for people between 60 and 64
years for a number of European countries and the USA. It starts at about
7% in Austria, goes via 40% in the USA and ends with 58% in Sweden and
Norway.
Freq. 7 12 12 21 22 31 35 40 43 58 58
Nation Au Fr It Sp Ger Gree Den US UK Swe Nor
Table 2: Employment frequency in per cent, 60-64 years. Source: Eurostat.
The official and the real pension age also vary across the European
countries, highest in Iceland with 67 and 66 years, and lowest in France
with 60 and 59 years, respectively. The problems with longevity and cohort
risk are thus seen to have both macro, public, and political economic
perspectives.
15 Summary, discussion and extensions
The life cycle model is analyzed in two steps; first with only a credit market
and mortality risk, then with a securities market added. The analysis
provides an optimal demand theory from the point of view of the
consumers, who are also potential life and pension insurance customers. In
this model optimal insurance contracts are derived, assuming they exist,
which we then compare to real contracts. We have derived several
conclusions from this model, some with more predictive, or normative
power than others, which we now summarize.
The first result was related to the optimal consumption path in the
situation with only a credit market. When there is life time uncertainty, the
optimal consumption paths are shown to be crucially dependent on the
impatience rate. The impatient consumer (δ > r) must always look forward
to an ever decreasing optimal consumption, since dc∗t/dt = (r − δ)T (c∗t ).
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The patient agent (δ < r), on the other hand, can look forward to an ever
increasing optimal consumption.
While this gives an interesting and intuitive interpretation of the
impatience rate δ, it is not likely to give reliable predictions. With a
securities market included this property is diluted, by both a new addition
to the drift term and a diffusion term. In particular the latter will dictate
consumption paths to deviate from the simple, deterministic description
just given. This opens up for interpersonal comparisons of consumption
behavior at the same time in agents’ life cycles. Impatience is more
naturally discussed in terms of expectations when a stock market is present,
in which case the market-price-of-risk, risk aversion and time preference
(ψ−1) must all be taken into account when characterizing this property.
The optimal pensions contain an additional random function when a stock
market is included. This function is reciprocal to the state price density, a
fact which was found to have several interesting implications. In particular
the optimal pensions are found to be positively correlated with the
economy in the sense that when stock prices are high, the pensions are also
high, and vice versa. In the conventional model this a quite natural
property, in particular for the aggregate economy, since such a consumption
pattern is consistent with what the economy can deliver.
This inspired a discussion of what insurance companies can do to offer more
reasonable pension and life insurance contracts to the public. We indicated
that by making reserves, pensions can be offered that smooth the
individuals life time consumption, which is clearly desirable in general, for
any reasonable set of preferences. The reason that life insurance companies
can offer such smoothing, is that they can time diversify in the financial
markets, something individual customers can not manage quite that well.
We have a simple demonstration of the advantages of pooling with regard
to pensions. It is shown that, with the same economic resources, the
optimal yearly consumption is strictly larger with pooling, than without.
This shows the mutuality idea is fruitful, a fact that is worth a reminder, in
particular since we live in a time of individualism, seemingly picturing a
world in which we are solely responsible for our own successes and failures.
Optimal life insurance, where the insured amount is endogenously
determined, is analyzed, and its properties are found reasonable. Like
pension insurance, also the insured amounts in life insurance are co-cyclical
with the economy. This can be mitigated by the life insurance industry,
just as for pensions.
It should be pointed out that we know little about the specification of the
utility function v, when it serves a bequest motive, as compared to u for the
standard model. Life insurance is an important financial tool for controlling
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inter-personal transfers, which necessitates references to the theory of
transfers (like e.g., Bernheim, Schleifer and Summers (1985)). We show
that if the insured amount is to be countercyclical to the economy, and thus
be a bona fide insurance against tough times for the beneficiaries, this
requires risk proclivity of the bequest function v. This effectively rules out
this possibility. A countercyclical insured amount appears desirable in a
finance setting, but risk proclivity does not. This is where the insurance
industry can improve welfare.
We compared our results to both actuarial theory and insurance practice.
With regard to pensions it was found that defined contribution plans are
most in line with the optimal contracts found in this paper for the
conventional model. However, consumption smoothing over the life cycle is
preferred by all consumers, due to their time preference. Our conventional
model is based on a representative customer, who, when calibrated to data,
happens to have low substitution elasticity and high risk aversion and time
preference. Although we do not want to draw too many conclusions directly
from this, it can be pointed out that such an individual is likely to prefer to
purchase a pension contract with guarantees.
We have argued that insurance companies should be especially well suited
to take on market risk, since they normally have a long term perspective.
This would enable them to realize the risk premiums in the market in the
long run, which after all are time averages. This is time diversification.
If an insurance company only offers defined contribution pension plans,
there is virtually no financial risk involved in this line of business, and as a
consequence this company can only expect to earn about the risk free rate
in equilibrium, in the long run. Such a return on the company’s operations
is unlikely to meet the requirements of its owners. However, the
consequences for a privately owned insurance corporation is that equity can
then be set low. With risk subsidies from, say the government, the average
cost of capital is low. By the leverage effect debt has on total returns, the
expected return on equity can then still be high.
Much has been written about the recent financial crises of 2007-9. One
criticism of the financial industry that has been put forth is that the
financial firms were eager to collect fees for their services, by inventing all
kinds of products that were difficult to understand for ordinary customers.
Such fees can not be directly considered as a compensation for risks, but
were one basis for the profits in the industry. As long as prices went up,
this seemed to work, but as soon as confidence in the system started to fail,
the collapse came partly as a consequence of failed risk management,
among other factors. However, this is not the major criticism of the
industry - it is its ability to leave the downside risk to the taxpayers.
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Financial firms trading in derivatives may access unbounded liability
exposures and are granted limited liability. Under such circumstances an all
equity firm holds a call option, whereby it receives a free option to put
losses back to the taxpayers (e.g., Eberlein and Madan (2010)). In such a
situation increasing volatility increases the value of both assets and the
liabilities, thereby creating perverse incentives.
With defined contribution products, the insurers’ equity can be kept low,
but the return on equity should, at least in principle, only be high provided
the insurers are clever in collection fees from the customers, since there is
virtually no financial risk involved. If the products are largely standardized,
competition should bring down these fees, and also the profit margins for
the insurers. For this reason insurers are are sometimes ingenious in tailor
making products to customers, where terms are opaque and difficult to
compare.
In some countries there are state guarantees issued for individual pensions.
As with banks, where the government has a stake because it insures
deposits, the reason is to preserve the stability of the financial system,
which is important to preserving the stability of the economy. If an
insurance company gets into a situation of distress, the government may
have to come in to honor its commitments to the insurance customers,
which can be done by conservatorship. Because of the importance of thrust
between the population and the life insurance industry, it is more common
that life insurance companies in distress are taken over by other companies
in the industry. In the 2007-09 crisis, in the US the government chose to
provide funds to the financial firms with virtually ”no strings attached”.
This may distort both risk management in the future, as well as proper
pricing of the products.
Related is the desire to keep equity low, especially for institutions that are
”too big to fail”. By the Miller and Modigliani (M&M) theorems the value
of the firms (like insurance companies and banks) should be independent of
the capital structure so long as the investments are unaffected9. Since
banks may be bailed out by the government, the cost of capital can be low
in these sectors. The M&M-theory predicts that the cost of capital is a
constant function of leverage. In practice, for an industrial firm the cost of
capital is U-shaped as a function of the debt ratio. At the beginning it falls
because of the tax advantage of debt, for larger value of the debt ratio it
increases because of bankruptcy costs. This trade-off is typically broken for
financial firms with an implicit government risk subsidy. Focusing on
banks, the low average cost of capital is due to the government’s role in the
9abstracting from bankruptcy costs, taxes, regulations, and agency problems
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case of bankruptcy. By keeping equity low, the owners can obtain high
returns on equity, not necessarily because of good risk taking, but rather
due to the risk subsidy granted by government, combined with the leverage
effect of debt on the expected rate of return on equity.
The low level of equity held prior to the 2007-crisis, together with a
previous deregulation, also tempted some to higher risk taking, which
meant that the investment profile changed as a consequence of the special
capital structure in the banking industry. This is moral hazard, and
certainly brings us outside the M&M framework. Prior to the financial
crisis this behavior increased the risk (unnecessarily) for all the agents
involved, except the creditors, the result of which is known by now. There
are also elements of moral hazard in the relationship between owners and
management. Many of the same features are present also in the life
insurance industry, although to a lesser extent.
It is essential that the financial industry and the population at large learns
from this, so that future crises become less severe. In order for the relevant
requirement on equity and reserves to be appropriate, both incentives must
be aligned with societal goals, and governments must get in place a proper
regulatory regime that works. The ’too big to fail’ doctrine must be broken,
and the creditors must be forced to take potential losses. This may
downgrade the debt of banks, but will motivate banks to increase their
equity ratios.
Finally the paper discusses optimal portfolio choice strategies. This
culminates with the formula (69), characterizing the optimal plan in the
context of pure demand theory. When applied to market data this formula
overestimates ordinary consumers’ exposures to risky securities. As with all
simple formulas, there are pros and cons. The advantage is the simple logic
this formula conveys, the drawback is that it is framed in a very simple
model of a complete, frictionless financial market, which is, perhaps
sometimes taken too literally. One particular assumption about this market
is that the investment opportunity set is constant. (The recursive model
turns out to do much better in this regard, and can better explain observed
data.)
Another weakness with the theory of optimal portfolio choice is related to
the ”horizon problem”. Here we make a deviation from the additive and
separable preference representation: We relax the separability of state and
time in the felicity index u(x, t) in the standard model. This is unusual in
economic models. Nevertheless, it has the potential to explain observed
behavior, namely that as investors grow older, they invest a larger
proportion of their wealth in government bonds.
If we take into account also the supply side of the economy, and for
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example study Pareto optimal contracts, this may give a clearer picture of
some of the problems discussed. We know that such contracts are ”smooth”
at each time, unless there are frictions of some kinds, and including the
supply side of the economy may give contracts different from what follows
by demand theory alone.
We observed that the growth rate of aggregate consumption in society has
low estimated volatility when calibrated to data, with a relatively high
estimate for the growth rate. This is not consistent with the model, hence
the consumption puzzles of Section 5.
This general discussion revealed several weaknesses with the additive and
separable framework of von Neumann and Morgenstern expected utility in
a temporal context. One reason singled out is that the risk preference has
two different, and sometimes conflicting interpretations in this model. We
have therefore introduced recursive utility in a companion paper, containing
a separation of consumption substitution from risk aversion. This gives a
better explanation of market and consumption data, which opens up for
several new interpretations.
Finally we presented some comments on longevity risk and cohort risk, and
concluded that these problems are, perhaps, best analyzed in the
perspective of macro, public, and political economics.
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